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This article examines the impact of the ethnic exclusiveness of regimes on commitment problems 
and hence on civil conflict duration. It argues that members of privileged in-groups in highly 
exclusive regimes can be trapped into compliance with the regime. Ethnic exclusion helps to 
construct privileged-group members as regime loyalists. They therefore fear rebel reprisals even 
if they surrender or defect, and hence persist in fighting. The article finds in particular that 
privileged-group members mistrust even rebels who mobilize on a non-ethnic agenda. Severe 
ethnic exclusion induces members of privileged groups to regard rebel reassurances, including 
non-ethnic aims, as suspect. Exclusion therefore induces privileged-group cohesion, an effect 
more resistant to rebel reassurances than previously recognized. A case study of the Syrian civil 
war shows this dynamic at a micro level, and a cross-national statistical analysis gives partial 
evidence that it lengthens civil conflicts on a large scale.  
This article examines whether, and how, ethnic politics makes civil conflicts long and 
intractable.
1
 It studies the impact of regime ethnic
2
 exclusiveness on credible commitments and 
hence on civil war duration. It argues that ethnic exclusion by the regime undermines the trust in 
rebel reassurances that members of privileged groups might have. Ethnic exclusion puts 
privileged groups in a loyalty trap: while some privileged-group members enjoy greater access to 
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power than others, all are identified by their ethnic identity as regime loyalists. Hence, they fear 
that they will be mistrusted and persecuted by rebels even if they surrender, defect or otherwise 
cooperate, and so will fight on. Recent studies of civil war severity and duration have made this 
argument as well,
3
 but they leave open a critical question: can rebels overcome this loyalty trap 
through reassurances to privileged-group members, for example by mobilizing for non-ethnic 
agendas? If they can, the loyalty trap problem can be mitigated, in principle. 
I show that rebels cannot fully overcome the mistrust that characterizes exclusive regimes 
by mobilizing along non-ethnic lines, seeking to transcend ethnic exclusion. While making non-
ethnic appeals may help rebels make credible reassurances to a certain extent, regime 
exclusiveness greatly limits this effect. The more exclusive the regime, the more members of 
privileged in-groups find rebel reassurances unconvincing. In other words, through exclusion, a 
regime can unilaterally weaken the credibility of its own adversary. The result is that, with rebel 
groups making non-ethnic appeals, civil wars are longer the more exclusive the regime. Non-
ethnic rebel appeals still do lead to shorter civil wars than mobilizing excluded groups, but the 
regime side’s own exclusion policy erodes the difference: non-ethnic rebellions can have civil 
wars that are just as long as rebels mobilizing excluded groups, provided the regime is 
sufficiently exclusive. There are twin tragic ironies here. Members of the in-group find it 
difficult to abandon the regime from which they (supposedly) benefit, keeping them in costly 
conflicts. And the very exclusion rebels seek to change undermines their credibility.  
I find evidence for one silver lining: the general effect of exclusion may be mitigated to 
some extent when the excluded population is diverse. I suggest that this is because, when there 
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are many out-groups, a rebel group has stronger incentives to hold to non-ethnic appeals to 
mobilize around a common program, and so those appeals are more credible. 
The article first demonstrates the plausibility of this loyalty trap in an analysis of the 
Syrian civil war. The primary rebel umbrella group at the outset of the war, the Free Syrian 
Army, at first avoided explicit identity claims in its official discourse, instead presenting itself as 
a broad-based pro-democracy movement against the brutally repressive, authoritarian and 
exclusive Assad regime. But some members of the Alawite minority dominate the regime, and 
the regime was and is popularly identified as Alawite. It was therefore difficult for any Alawite 
to believe pluralist opposition claims, and hence to believe that they would not be targets for 
revenge. The subsequent emergence of more sectarian Sunni rebel groups has reinforced this 
suspicion.  
The Syrian case indicates that regime exclusiveness makes it difficult for rebels to 
credibly propound a non-ethnic agenda and obtain cooperation among members of privileged 
groups. I further analyze whether these commitment problems emerging from exclusion apply 
beyond Syria and lead to longer civil wars. I find partial evidence that they do. Consistent with 
the loyalty trap, I find that even in conflicts where rebels do not make ethnic claims, regime 
exclusiveness, and especially excluding a few large groups, makes wars longer. However, I also 
find evidence that other mechanisms beyond the loyalty trap may help explain this finding.  
The article builds on and extends past work developing the commitment-problem 
approach to the identity dynamics of civil conflicts.
4
 This past work argues that civil conflicts are 
long and bloody when one side fears punishment along ethnic lines, and it identifies regime 
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exclusion as a source of this fear. Wucherpfennig and colleagues argue that “because exclusion 
generates feelings of resentment and fosters radicalism, it raises the costs [to members of a 
privileged group] of turning the tables…This commitment problem is likely to be particularly 
severe under minority rule,”
5
 and Heger and Salehyan argue that “members of the old regime 
may face purges, resulting in death or exile…when they form a small faction winning coalitions 
are easily targeted victims of persecution in the event of an overthrow.”
6
  
This article, however, draws out an important and previously unexplored implication of 
this commitment-problem approach: ethnic exclusion by the regime undermines the credibility of 
even non-ethnic rebel appeals, and hence makes civil conflicts longer even when rebels do not 
make ethnic claims. Wucherpfennig and colleagues test the impact of regime ethnic exclusion 
via rebel claims, arguing that exclusion along ethnic lines “makes it difficult for both for rebel 
groups fighting on behalf of excluded ethnic groups and for incumbent governments to reach 
settlements that would allow for effective conflict resolution, thus leading to protracted 
conflicts,”
7
 and finding that civil wars are longer if rebels mobilize politically excluded ethnic 
groups.
8
 I argue that the logic applies even to rebel groups that do not mobilize along ethnic 
lines, because regime exclusion undermines the reassurances that these non-ethnic claims might 
offer to members of privileged groups. Hence, lest one conclude that rebels can override the 
problems Wucherpfennig and colleagues highlight by propounding nonethnic agendas, I show 
that regime exclusion by itself makes these nonethnic claims less credible and lengthens civil 
wars. The argument is therefore similar to Heger and Salehyan’s finding that minority rule 
presages especially violent civil conflicts, since their empirical finding is about the regime and 
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not about rebel characteristics.
9
 I apply a similar analysis to civil conflict duration, and go further 
by breaking the result down by rebel claims, showing that exclusion lengthens civil conflicts 
even for non-ethnic rebels. 
However, I also highlight an important distinction on the regime side, between the 
concentrated benefits members of a narrow regime receive, and fear of reprisals. Heger and 
Salehyan refer to both factors to explain why members of ethnically exclusive regimes are 
especially motivated to fight, but the former explanation plays an especially central role in their 
argument. The smaller the governing coalition, the more each member of the coalition gets out of 
it, and the worse the loss would be from defeat or compromise.
10
 The fear of reprisal is a 
different mechanism with different observable implications. It suggests that not all narrow ruling 
coalitions are created equal: when an identity group is associated with the regime, its members 
may fear reprisal all the more. And it suggests that people may fight for a regime from which 
they do not especially profit, as long as they fear they are identified with it. 
Hence regime exclusion, by itself, has effects on civil conflict duration even if rebels seek 
to transcend it. The consequences are significant. The finding suggests that the compliance that 
ethnic preference policies encourage is more resistant than previously recognized to one side’s 
efforts to transcend polarization. Rebels seeking to replace an ethnically exclusive regime with a 
nonethnic agenda will find it difficult to sell that agenda, because of exclusion itself. In turn, the 
result clarifies the incentives for ethnic identity politics on both sides. For regimes, ethnic 
exclusion does not just keep members of the in-group compliant against rebels who mobilize out-
group; it gives them an ethnic frame to reinterpret even explicitly non-ethnic rebellions. For rebel 
groups, the result shows that, while there may be some benefit to be gained from mobilizing 
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along non-ethnic lines, this benefit is greatly weakened in highly exclusive regimes, and the 
relative benefits of ethnic mobilization are clearer.  
By showing that ethnically exclusive regimes experience longer civil wars even when 
rebels make nonethnic claims, I make three broader theoretical contributions. First, the article 
shows the need to pay more attention to the direct effect of the government side on identity 
dimensions of civil conflict. Standard definitions of “ethnic conflict” focus on the rebel side, 
even if they see regime policies as crucial elements of the background of ethnic conflicts. Data 
projects tend to code a whole conflict as “ethnic” if the rebel group involved explicitly claims to 
be acting on behalf of an ethnic group and recruits among that ethnic group;
11
 these studies 
attempt to identify systematic differences between this “type” of conflict and others. Even 
scholars who call into question the concept of “ethnic conflict” also focus on the rebel side. 
Kalyvas’ important article highlighting the scale of ethnic defection—that is, of people fighting 
against armed groups claiming to represent their ethnic group—deals above all with defection 
from rebels to government.
12
 In contrast, I argue that it is often regimes that put ethnic politics 
front and center in civil wars. They can make ethnic markers relevant directly, not just by 
provoking ethnic rebellion but by setting up an ethnic frame to interpret rebellions. It can be the 
rebel side that seeks to de-ethnicize politics, and the regime side that pushes an ethnic frame. I 
find that highly exclusive regimes are often successful in doing so in spite of rebels’ efforts. 
Second, the article develops empirical implications of a constructivist and institutionalist 
perspective on the role of ethnic identity on loyalty in conflict. Some scholars claim that ethnic 
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ties are a powerful, straightforward predictor of people’s loyalties in ethnic civil wars, making it 
difficult either to convince a losing side to surrender or to build a cross-ethnic coalition to 
support a peace agreement.
13
 However, others find that apparently “ethnic” conflicts involve 
many people who fight for the “wrong” side.
14
 Identity claims often emerge as ad-hoc 
justifications for coalitions that occur for other reasons, notably as actors seek survival and 
power.
15
 One might build on this skepticism to assert that identity claims are just epiphenomenal, 
so they do not really help understand which sides people support in civil conflicts. Another tack, 
which I follow, is to examine when and why identity boundaries are socially constructed as good 
predictors of people’s decisions to support one side or another.
16
 This approach is thus 
constructivist, arguing that the use of identity as a marker of loyalty is a social fact; it is not 
automatic but emerges as a consequence of the actions and discourses of various political actors. 
The account is also institutionalist, focusing in particular on the role of policies that limit access 
to political power. Specifically, I examine how ethnic preference policies create stable 
expectations of compliance along identity lines. I argue that systematically favoring one group 
often identifies that group with the regime. This makes it difficult for members of that group to 
cooperate with rebels, mistrusting even the latter’s nonethnic claims. 
 Finally, this article theorizes the link between individuals’ compliance with a regime and 
the duration of civil conflict. Scholars frequently argue that wars last long when the sides cannot 
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credibly commit to a settlement.
17
 I relax the assumption of unitary actors that underlies this 
approach
18
 and expand past the commitment problems facing leaders that have received some 
attention.
19
 A war can end if followers decide to lay down arms or turn those arms around. 
Surrender, desertion, and defection are important mechanisms by which wars—especially civil 
conflicts—end.
20
 Any factor that prevents these actions can therefore lengthen civil wars. Hence, 
this article develops a followers’ commitment problem: the inability to credibly commit to good 
treatment if an adversary’s follower defects or surrenders can lengthen a civil conflict. Moreover, 
going beyond past work showing the importance of credible promises of good treatment for 
inducing defection and surrender,
21
 it shows that one party to a conflict can lack credibility not 
because of its own characteristics or actions, but in fact because of its adversary’s. Specifically, 
by pursuing ethnic exclusion, a regime can make rebels less trustworthy. This has important 
implications: it means that, in the face of an adversary’s strategies, there is only so much one can 
do to prove one’s own trustworthiness. 
Ethnically exclusive regimes and civil wars 
My argument posits that ethnic identification is often a crucial element in a strategic 
calculus in which actors care mainly about survival, not about their “ethnic group’s interests,” 
which I do not take as given. I take seriously the question posed by Kalyvas, among others: to 
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show how ethnic identity might make a difference to individual strategic choice in civil conflicts, 
not just to assume that the analyst can treat ethnic groups as cohesive actors.
22
 Ethnic identity 
matters to the degree that political actors and institutions make use of identity labels to classify 
individuals and to promote some at the expense of others.
23
 
I argue that systematically excluding large numbers of people from political power on the 
basis of ethnic identity generates greater compliance with the regime among members of favored 
groups during civil conflicts. It does so through two main impacts on political life more broadly 
that carry on into wartime. First, exclusion identifies privileged-group members as regime 
loyalists. In everyday ethnic politics, exclusionary policies construct members of privileged 
groups as probable beneficiaries—and hence likely supporters—of the regime. Eventually, 
identity becomes a convenient information shortcut.
24
 Rather than needing to know whether 
someone actually gets a large share of benefits from the regime, one can simply use their identity 
markers, treating the regime as an ethnocracy, and hence treating members of privileged 
categories as all members of the regime.
25
 In civil conflicts especially, this process of labelling 
can serve as the basis for targeting people for “categorical” violence.
26
 Privileged-group 
members are likely to be highly aware of the possibility of being identified as regime loyalists.  
The second effect is indirect, through political actors and their strategies: ethnic exclusion 
permits both government and opposition politicians to reinforce ethnic frames in their political 
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action. In the background to civil conflict, ethnic exclusion encourages political opposition 
groups to present grievances and demands along identity lines. This identity-based mobilization 
tends to make an identity frame for understanding politics even more salient among privileged-
group members. It reinforces their sense of being identified with the regime. However, exclusion 
also provides fertile terrain for manipulation by state elites. By actively reminding in-group 
members of the possibility of mobilization on behalf of excluded groups, for example through 
spreading rumors of categorical violence, state elites and their agents can relatively easily 
reinforce pre-existing fears.  
When mounting a rebellion against a highly exclusive regime, rebel groups typically 
propound ethnic agendas.
27
 But, crucially, not all do, even if opposition politicians have long 
made identity claims. Many, perhaps recognizing the mistrust that an ethnic agenda would 
prompt, might try to adopt a non-ethnic platform. Using the Wucherpfennig et al data on rebel 
group linkages to ethnic groups,
28
 in the most exclusive quartile of regimes, 49 rebellions 
mobilize excluded groups, but 38 do not engage in ethnic mobilization (see Table 1 below). But 
the identification of in-group members as loyalists, coupled with a background of political 
mobilization on identity lines in the leadup to war, will tend to reinforce the fears of in-group 
members that rebels represent a threat to their safety because of their identity. With a background 
sense that they are identified with the regime, privileged-group members will fear revenge if the 
regime falls. They will be inclined to interpret the killing of civilians as categorical violence, 
even if it is not. And they may be particularly susceptible to elite reminders, such as rumors of 
categorical violence, planned or executed. Moreover, longstanding incentives for opposition to 
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mobilize along ethnic lines will persist. Privileged-group members will thus fear that even if a 
rebel group uses pluralist language now, it need not in the future. Pluralists might be outbid by 
rebel leaders more willing to push the interests of excluded groups. 
Thus systematic exclusion reinforces fears of indiscriminate punishment among 
privileged-group members, regardless of rebel promises of pluralism and good treatment. Fears 
of indiscriminate punishment, in turn, spur actors in civil wars to comply with the side that can 
protect them from this violence. People who believe that they will likely be targeted by side A 
due to ascriptive characteristics will find little reason to cooperate with side A, and will instead 
comply with side B. After all, if they attempt to comply with side A, they might still suffer 
violence; at least by complying with side B they might enjoy the latter’s protection.
29
 Fearing 
that rebels will victimize them whatever they do, some members of privileged groups may 
remain compliant with the regime to stay safe. This fear operates in spite of rebel attempts at 
reassurance, because rebels might be seeking to obtain their acquiescence before reneging.  
In short, a crucial and underexplored effect of regime ethnic exclusion is to undermine 
the credibility of the non-ethnic character of rebel agendas. Even if rebel groups adopt a pluralist 
agenda to try to promise good treatment to privileged-group members, a history of ethnic 
mobilization, the salience of an ethnic frame (reinforced by regime leaders), and the clear 
potential for the return of such an agenda will often spur mistrust of any rebels among 
privileged-group members. They will therefore tend to be more compliant with the regime, and 
less inclined to defect, surrender or cooperate with rebels. 
In turn, privileged-group compliance reduces the likelihood that a conflict will end. As 
the above analysis demonstrates, this is a commitment problem: rebels cannot credibly commit to 
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pluralism and to non-discrimination against privileged-group members. The result is longer civil 
wars. Unlike the standard unitary commitment problem,
30
 in which Side A fears to surrender or 
negotiate because Side B may not keep its promises once Side A has lain down its arms, this 
followers’ commitment problem assumes that followers’ interests may often diverge from those 
of their leaders or their armed groups. Opposition groups, above all, win civil conflicts by 
inducing rank-and-file combatants and civilians on the other side to surrender and defect.
31
 But if 
followers and civilians cannot be reassured that they can safely surrender, defect or cooperate, 
civil war termination is harder. 
Some qualifiers are in order. First, a highly exclusive regime might exclude many 
different identity groups, and holding a coalition of such groups together might well require 
credible non-ethnic claims. In contrast, regimes that exclude a single large ethnic category might 
strengthen the loyalty trap further. A rebel group’s non-ethnic claims would typically be less 
credible here, for there is likely to be a history of mobilization and strong incentives to renege on 
pluralism and mobilize this excluded group. In turn, mobilizing a large group along identity lines 
may ultimately pose a particularly fearsome threat to members of a small in-group.
32
 Hence, a 
diverse excluded population may mitigate the result here somewhat. 
Second, this theoretical approach stresses that regime exclusion by itself can prompt 
compliance and long civil wars, in spite of rebels’ non-ethnic claims. The scope for the 
approach’s key contribution, therefore, is to be found in the context of rebellions that do not 
propound ethnic agendas. Moreover, it is not clear that how exclusive a regime is should make a 
difference to civil war duration when rebels mobilize excluded ethnic groups. After all, the 
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commitment problem can apply on the rebel side; once launched, it is difficult for rebels to lay 
down their arms, fearing identity-based reprisals.
33
 Rebels claiming to represent proportionately 
small and geographically isolated ethnic groups have spurred very long civil conflicts (say, 
rebellions in southern Thailand or Mindanao in the southern Philippines). It may therefore not 
take a highly exclusive regime to spur a long-running insurgency along ethnic lines. The 
argument may be more relevant to civil conflicts over government than over territory, but given 
that privileged-group members are often present in territory claimed by rebels, it is relevant to 
territorial conflicts too.  
Finally, it is worth asking to what extent the thesis only applies to ethnic exclusion. To be 
sure, other things besides communal identity can also furnish markers of loyalty, such as class 
identity or political affiliation.
34
 Ethnic identity may be especially common in identifying 
loyalties in the medium term because it is comparatively difficult to change, based as it is upon 
“attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent.”
35
 But in the short time 
scale involved in civil war, other markers might be used too. Hence, I do not argue that my 
approach only applies to ethnic identity. This article focuses on ethnic exclusion, then, largely 
because identity divisions seem to be relatively frequently used as bases of political exclusion 
and of identifying loyalties.
36
 Communal divisions have political currency in many different 
settings, providing a point of reference and permitting large-scale comparisons.  
Several kinds of evidence are relevant for this approach. At a micro level, members of a 
privileged minority in a highly exclusive regime should believe themselves locked into loyalty in 
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the face of an armed rebellion. In particular, even members of the supposedly privileged in-group 
who do not much materially benefit from the regime should have this belief—in contrast to an 
approach based on concentrated benefits under exclusive regimes.
37
 It should also be clear that 
privileged-group members see a rebel group’s claims to a non-ethnic agenda as non-credible, and 
are fearful of categorical violence despite such claims. And it should be clear that this feeds their 
decisions not to comply with the rebels. In the next section, I demonstrate how the argument 
applies to the Syrian case in 2011-2012. While space does not permit comparative case studies, 
the Syrian case represents an extreme-value case: an initially non-ethnic rebellion (the Free 
Syrian Army) in the face of an extremely exclusive regime with an excluded population 
dominated numerically by Sunni Arabs. This case therefore suggests the plausibility of the 
argument in an environment conducive to finding evidence for it. I therefore complement this 
analysis with a large-scale statistical test. 
At a macro level, comparative and statistical studies have already found evidence for one 
key step in the argument, that ethnically exclusive regimes face relatively little defection from 
privileged-group members. This finding emerges in studies both of defection in the face of 
uprisings from below
38
 and of military coups.
39
 In addition to loyalty and defection patterns, 
however, we should find at a macro level that, with a non-ethnic rebellion, the more exclusive 
the regime, the longer the civil war. I test this novel implication in the second empirical section.  
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A theory-building case: Syria’s Alawites 
 The Syrian civil war, ongoing since 2011, illustrates the central theoretical dynamics I 
outline above, and indeed spurred their development. Some members of the Alawite Arab 
minority dominate executive power in the Syrian regime. While the regime certainly includes 
non-Alawites, there is clear and significant underrepresentation of other categories (the Sunni 
Arab majority, Christian and Druze Arabs, and Kurds) in the regime. In turn, identity frames are 
salient for Alawites. Hence, a fear of being targeted by the opposition regardless of their 
behavior, a fear manipulated and magnified by specific regime strategies, helps keep Alawites 
compliant. In recounting the Syrian case, I do not differ from the widely held scholarly view that, 
despite considerable power inequalities among Alawites, they often support the regime out of 
fear of the opposition.
40
 As I argue below, though, there are crucial differences between this 
account and the popular conventional wisdom: above all, the analysis does not mean that 
behavior flows directly from identity. 
 Syria’s regime pursues a high degree of exclusion along identity lines; in turn, as the 
loyalty trap expects, opposition has often mobilized excluded categories too. Alawites, a 
religious minority usually held to be about 12% of the population of Syria, dominate the military 
establishment and have done since the late 1970s. Constituting a large majority of non-
commissioned officers by the mid-1950s, Alawites came to dominate the officer corps as 
factionalism among Sunni officers led to successive coups and purges from the late 1940s 
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 Pronouncing an official Ba’thist doctrine of secular, socialist Arab 
nationalism, the regime of Hafiz al-Assad (1970-2000) increasingly relied upon a core of 
Alawites, and in particular those with family connections to the president himself.
42
 The regime 
narrowed its base especially after the 1976-82 uprising of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood and the 
regime’s brutal response. Brotherhood claims that Alawites were heretics, and the massacre of 
dozens of mainly Alawite military cadets in Aleppo in 1979, fed Alawite fears of the 
Brotherhood and of Sunni sectarian politics.
43
 Assad entrusted Alawite-dominated military units 
with the repression of the Brotherhood. It was these units, most notably, that killed tens of 
thousands in the destruction of the city of Hama in 1982 and thereby ended the uprising.
44
 The 
reliance on Alawites continued and heightened after the uprising. According to Batatu, Alawites 
held two of five divisional commands in 1973, and seven of nine by 1992.
45
  Hafiz’s son Bashar 
al-Assad, in power since Hafiz’s death in 2000, further narrowed the regime (for example 
ousting the most prominent Sunni senior officer in 2005) and became more dependent on 
familial ties in crony capitalism.
46
 
 Although Alawites dominate the military elite, there is hardly a perfect correlation 
between being Alawite and receiving state privilege, or being Sunni and not. Regime members’ 
state-business networks frequently include Sunni businesspeople, though more in individualized 
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network relationships than through incorporating the Sunni business class as a group.
47
 Further, 
despite Ba’thist rural development policies, many Alawites have remained economically 
disadvantaged.
48
 However, at a broader scale than just the military elite, it does appear that 
Alawites systematically enjoyed greater access to government employment than average.
49
  
 As the loyalty trap expects, however, exclusion policies have hidden intra-sectarian 
differences by identifying Alawites as loyalists. Alawites are supposedly identifiable by their 
family names, places of origin, and pronunciation in Arabic.
50
 A joke about the regime 
demonstrates the public’s equation of the regime with Alawites, saying that in Assad’s palace, 
“even the phones ring in ‘Alawi dialect.”
51
 In turn, people arrested by state security have 
sometimes tried to fake an Alawite accent.
52
 This labelling elides social and political differences 
among Alawites. Alawites in central cities, for example Homs, often argue that the real power 
among Alawites is in coastal settlements, such as Qardaha (Hafiz al-Assad’s town of origin). But 
they also recount their Sunni neighbors’ belief that, as Alawites, they have special advantages.
53
 
 Despite the dominance of narrowly sectarian Sunni groups the last few years of the 
Syrian civil war, the beginning of the war illustrates that rebels in ethnically exclusive regimes 
sometimes attempt to push non-ethnic agendas. It therefore also helps illustrate whether they can 
be successful in doing so. When demonstrations began in March 2011, opposition activists 
attempted consciously to push back against sectarian narratives, specifically trying to reassure 
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Alawites that they would not be harmed.
54
 Opposition slogans included “Not Sunni and not 
Alawi, we want freedom.”
55
 Activists organized meetings among leaders of different 
communities, for example in Jableh and in Homs, to combat possibly regime-planted rumors of 
sectarian violence.
56
 Though demonstrations were concentrated in Sunni communities according 
to Mazur’s event-count data,
57
 demonstrators were far from exclusively Sunni. Some Alawis 
took prominent roles.
58
 After the descent into civil war, the leadership of the opposition in the 
Syrian National Council and its affiliated rebel army, the Free Syrian Army, have called above 
all for the removal of Assad and the establishment of a democratic regime, not identity-based 
appeals. 
The regime’s master narrative about the demonstrations, in contrast, was that they were 
narrowly sectarian. According to regime propaganda, the opposition would promote Sunni 
Islamist extremism.
59
 As demonstrations rolled across Tunisia in late 2010 and early 2011, but 
before the outbreak of large-scale protest in Syria, word descended the military chain of 
command to prepare to face attack from Islamist radical groups.
60
 This extremism, according to 
the regime, would threaten Syria’s religious minorities and secular Sunnis alike. Indeed, it is 
notable that the regime did not tend to mobilize Alawites through narrowly pro-Alawite rhetoric, 
instead stressing its Syrian nationalism so as not to alienate its non-Alawite supporters.
61
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Underneath its official propaganda, however, the regime targeted Alawite communities 
with efforts to heighten fears not only of Islamism but of Sunnis generally. In doing so, the 
regime played on and reinforced the existing identity frame for understanding violence, 
illustrating the limits of rebel attempts to propound non-ethnic agendas. Regime agents 
distributed sandbags in some Alawite villages, telling residents to prepare to be attacked by 
Sunnis.
62
 The regime seems especially to have manipulated the fears of residents of the new, 
mainly Alawite suburbs of cities like Damascus and Homs.
63
 One resident of such a community 
reported that government agents distributed automatic weapons in his neighbourhood.
64
 As 
Phillips argues, the regime’s narrative of Sunni Islamism and rumors of sectarian violence had a 
receptive audience.
65
 Many were ready to take the automatic weapons that the regime 
distributed: “‘They told us, “The Sunnis are going to kill you”…They scared us. Of course some 
people in our community are narrow-minded; they believed them and, unfortunately, many 
people accepted the weapons.’”
66
  
Hence, Alawites’ receptiveness to rumors of identity-based mobilization and targeting 
emerged from long-standing regime exclusion policies, not just from rebel behavior. It must be 
noted, though, that endogenous conflict dynamics subsequently reinforced Alawite fear. The 
regime’s utterly brutal response to largely nonviolent demonstrations helped to encourage the 
opposition to take up arms, in turn heightening Alawite fears of a spiral into reprisal killing.
67
 
Members of the opposition, including members of the “mainstream” opposition, also began to 
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deploy more sectarian slogans and actions that lumped Alawites together. One opposition activist 
said, “Every Alawite between the age of 16 to 40 is a murderer, whether he likes it or not.”
68
 
New slogans included “We didn’t used to hate the Alawis, now we do.”
69
 Prominent opposition 
figures were recorded saying that Alawites would be “exterminated.”
70
 Indeed, the regime may 
have encouraged opposition sectarianism directly. In May and June 2011, it released numerous 
imprisoned jihadists, claiming an attempt at conciliation. Opposition activists and ex-prisoners 
themselves argue that the regime fully intended that the released prisoners would take up arms.
71
 
Thus over the course of 2012 and 2013, more explicitly sectarian and extremist rebel 
groups like the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) gained prominence in 
the war, overtaking the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army.
72
 Such groups 
explicitly called for, and deployed, horrific violence against civilians,
73
 sometimes identifying 
religious minorities as enemies to be killed and recording videos of horrors they perpetrated.
74
 
From this point on, it becomes somewhat more difficult to see whether the regime’s exclusion or 
the sectarian rebellions did more to reinforce Alawite fears. But for 2011 and much of 2012, I 
argue that existing regime exclusion policies and short-run manipulations did much to promote 
these fears, undermining the rebels’ attempts to reassure Alawites through an officially non-
sectarian agenda.  
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In this environment of fear, Alawites largely remained compliant with the regime. Most 
notably, relatively few Alawites in the security services defected. This is despite the estimated 
10-25,000 defectors, from a 200,000-strong military, that have formed the backbone of the Free 
Syrian Army.
75
 Sunnis, who had formed most of the rank and file of the regime’s forces, were 
the large majority of defectors.
76
 Outside of the formal military, Alawites have provided an 
important manpower reserve in militias,
77
 though Sunnis have joined as well.
78
  
It is clear that this compliance rests to a great degree on fear of the opposition. Even some 
Alawites sympathetic with the opposition found themselves believing they did not have a place 
in the opposition and that the regime’s preservation was an existential issue.
79
 Indeed, many 
Alawites appeared to believe that, even if they attempted to cooperate with the rebels, the latter 
would still target them. While some Alawites reported being welcomed into the opposition at 
first, there was clearly suspicion in opposition circles. One opposition activist in Damascus said 
the opposition would suspect that Alawites in their ranks were spies, and one of his Alawite 
acquaintances in the opposition revealed his sect to few.
80
 Wajdy Mustafa, an exiled Alawite 
activist, reports that opposition sympathizers among Alawites often “fear seeking haven among 
the Sunnis, too, lest they be killed for their sect.”
81
  
                                                 
75
 Hinnebusch, “Syria,” 110; Phillips, “Syria’s Torment,” 76. 
76
 Holger Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid 
the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 1 (2015): 36-54; Hicham Bou Nassif, “‘Second-Class’: The 
Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (2015): 626-49; 
Kevin Koehler, Dorothy Ohl, and Holger Albrecht, “From Disaffection to Defection: How Networks Facilitate 
Military Insubordination in Civil Conflict,” Comparative Politics 48, no. 4 (2016): 439-57. 
77
 Hinnebusch, “Syria,” 108. 
78
 Droz-Vincent, “‘State of Barbary’ (Take Two),” 54. 
79
 Paoli, “Et maintenant, on va où?,” 137-38. 
80
 Nir Rosen, “Syria’s Alawite Activists Stuck in the Middle,” Al-Jazeera, March 8, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/03/201237101424192726.html. 
81
 MacFarquhar, “Assad’s Response.” 
22 
 
This compliance among Alawites has extended well beyond those who benefited directly 
from the regime. For example, despite a sense among Alawites from Homs that they do not enjoy 
the privileges of Alawites from the coast, the belief that Sunnis see them as privileged has 
apparently helped to reinforce their willingness to fight.
82
 Anecdotes indeed abound of Alawites 
who have very little good to say about the Assad regime but will continue to fight for it out of 
fear.
83
 According to Abu Khader (a nickname), a member of the Republican Guard, Assad is a 
“thief” who “got us into this war to keep his authority. But as Alawites, we are forced to fight, 
because the opposition is all Sunnis, and they want to kill us all.”
84
 Thus the rebels are all 
interpreted in a sectarian frame, whether they make sectarian claims or not. In other words, 
privileging members of a minority group affects their loyalties not only because it concentrates 




As the war has dragged on and Alawite sacrifices have increased, their resentment of the 
regime has grown as well. Correspondingly, there are increasing reports of acts of resistance, like 
roadblocks against military recruiters, in Alawite communities.
86
 Alawite willingness to fight 
may therefore not last. But it has lasted thus far.  
At the beginning of the Syrian conflict, then, the principal umbrella rebel group attempted 
to emphasize a non-ethnic agenda, focusing on removing the Assad regime, with hopes that 
doing so would reassure Alawites. I argue, however, that the regime’s exclusion, and the 
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resulting history of sectarian mobilization and opportunities for manipulation, facilitated an 
identity frame for understanding the conflict and its violence. This stoked Alawites’ fears, 
keeping them compliant. As sectarian rebel groups came to the fore, the direct contribution of the 
regime’s exclusion on Alawites’ compliance and civil war duration is harder to gauge, but it is 
noteworthy that the result has often been to elide differences between sectarian and non-sectarian 
rebels. Many Alawites seem unwilling to believe that non-sectarian opposition claims could be 
credible. 
Several qualifications are in order. First, given the importance of international support 
from Hizbullah, Iran and Russia in defending the regime, and the fact that the regime’s own 
security forces are far from exclusively Alawite, one cannot necessarily conclude that Alawite 
combatants have been, strictly speaking, sufficient to keep the regime in power. But it is clear 
that they have considerably assisted the regime’s war effort. 
Second, many Alawites might not be “really” fearful of the opposition, but may believe 
they have to follow and perpetuate the regime’s narrative of the conflict. Lisa Wedeen 
emphasizes the importance, under the Assad regime, of figuring out what the regime wants one 
to do and doing it. That is, Syrians often act “as if” the regime’s narratives were true, and in 
doing so, help to constitute the regime’s power.
87
 In the case of sectarian views of the conflict in 
2011, claims that the opposition would target Alawites may have worked in a similar way: 
Alawites may have repeated them whether they believed them or not, constructing a narrative of 
sectarian conflict that governed Alawite behavior, and constructing dissidents as traitors to the 
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Alawites as well as to Syria. Indeed, some Alawites do appear to have enforced group norms of 
compliance, targeting other Alawites who criticize the regime.
88
  
My account differs from popular understandings of the Syrian civil war as a “sectarian 
conflict,” where everyone’s loyalties are easily read off of their identities. First, I make no claim 
about any actors other than Alawites. The brutal fighting in the crucial city of Aleppo, for 
example, cuts across the Sunni community.
89
 Relatedly, it is essential not to read into my account 
the idea that Alawites support Assad purely out of identity solidarity with a largely Alawite 
elite.
90
 Indeed, as noted, frustration and anger at the regime appear fairly common among 
Alawites. My argument, indeed, is that despite this resentment, Alawites are heavily dissuaded 
from cooperating with rebels. The construction of Alawites as privileged, and of Sunnis as 
disenfranchised and harboring grievances, sustained the fear of Sunni mobilization and 
categorical violence, even in the early days when the officially non-sectarian opposition was in 
the ascendant. 
Cross-national hypothesis-testing 
In the Syrian case, the loyalty trap seems powerful in reducing the credibility of rebel 
attempts to portray themselves as non-ethnic and thereby reassure privileged-group members. 
Does this mechanism help explain the duration of civil conflict more widely? Wucherpfennig 
and colleagues provide important recent research that focuses on rebel ethnic claims in the 
context of regime ethnic exclusion, arguing that rebel groups that mobilize excluded ethnic 
groups are able to sustain their efforts over longer periods of time. They find that civil conflicts 
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involving such groups tend to last longer than civil conflicts where rebels claim to represent 
politically included ethnic groups or make no such ethnic claims. They argue that this is in part 
because exclusive regimes raise in-group members’ fears of revenge.
91
 But, by focusing on 
ethnic mobilization by the rebel group as the key way that commitment problems get activated, 
they leave unexplored one important implication of the commitment-problem logic, which I 
investigate here: that rebel claims to pluralism are less credible when regimes are more 
exclusive. Hence even when rebel groups do not make ethnic claims, the exclusiveness of the 
regime should undermine their pluralist discourse, reinforce privileged-group loyalty, and 
produce longer civil conflicts.  
I use data from Wucherpfennig and colleagues on the duration of civil conflict.
92
 These 
data are based on the UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflict Dataset,
93
 covering 375 conflict dyads in 
the period 1946-2005. To generate indicators of overall regime ethnic exclusiveness, I linked this 
dataset with the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) version 3 data on the ethnic composition of 
access to executive power at the outset of each rebellion.
94
 Wucherpfennig and colleagues 
introduce the ACD2EPR data linking rebel organizations to politically included and excluded 
ethnic groups.
95
 A rebel organization is considered linked to an ethnic group if both (a) recruits 
mainly among and (b) claims to represent that ethnic group. The appropriate frame for my 
analysis is the 179 rebel groups that are not linked to any ethnic group.
96
 This is because the key 
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implication of the loyalty trap is that exclusive regimes make it hard for rebels to credibly 
present themselves as non-ethnic. When rebels make ethnic claims, it is plausible that these 
claims by themselves undermine privileged-group members’ trust in rebels, and that the regime’s 
degree of ethnic exclusion would not make much difference on top of this. Moreover, when 
rebels make ethnic claims, it is frequently on behalf of small excluded groups to whom even a 
regime including a large majority cannot make credible commitments, with the consequence that 
civil wars tend to be lengthy.
97
 Hence there is not much reason to suppose that the degree of 
regime exclusion should have a clear effect on civil conflict duration with excluded-group 
rebellions. I also use a model with both excluded-group and non-ethnic rebellions, interacting 
rebel agendas with the regime’s ethnic exclusiveness, in order to test to what extent 




To conceptualize and measure the major independent variable, the exclusiveness of a 
regime, I examine the share of the population broken down by access to political power 
according to the EPR dataset. Following EPR, an ethnic category may be privileged in access to 
power (included), systematically excluded, or simply irrelevant to politics (neither privileged, 
nor discriminated against, nor mobilized in politics). I expect that, in civil conflicts in which 
rebels do not make ethnic claims, the larger the excluded share, the longer the civil conflict. Civil 
war duration should, in contrast, be decreasing in both included and irrelevant shares—the 
former because a larger included share may be likely to produce internal divisions that rebels can 
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exploit if they can make cross-ethnic appeals; the latter because it indicates that for a more 
substantial share of the population, ethnicity is just not as salient.  
However, a countervailing tendency may weaken the relationship between size of 
excluded population and civil war duration. A larger excluded population may mean many 
excluded groups; in turn, this diversity may make non-ethnic claims among rebels more credible, 
since rebel leaders have to make appeals across ethnic lines.
99
 In contrast, with a single large 
excluded group (as with Sunnis in Syria) the fear that the rebellion will eventually act along 
identity lines and will threaten the incumbent minority might be especially strong.  
Hence: 
H1. In civil conflict dyads in which the rebel organization does not claim to represent an 
ethnic group, the larger and more concentrated the share of the population belonging to 
politically excluded ethnic categories, the longer the civil conflict. 
I measure exclusion and the concentration of the excluded population together, in two ways. 
First, I include the share of the population belonging to politically excluded ethnic categories and 
control for the number of excluded categories, since a larger share excluded should naturally 
correlate with more excluded groups (r = .264 in my dataset). Second, I use share of the 
population belonging to the largest excluded category, capturing both exclusion and the 
concentration of the excluded population in a single metric. 
Table 1 lists the frequency of types of rebel organization by the share of the population 
excluded from power, to show where the data are. As one might expect, there is a clear trend for 
more excluded-group rebellions, and fewer included-group rebellions, in more exclusive regimes 
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(chi-square = 32.31, p <.001). But, notably, there are plenty of rebel organizations that do not 
make ethnic claims even in exclusive regimes, making my hypothesis empirically important. 
 
Table 1. Frequency of rebellions by exclusiveness and ethnic link of rebellion 
Quartile of regime 
exclusiveness 
(% excluded by 
ethnicity) 
Rebels do not make 
ethnic claims 






























I follow Wucherpfennig and colleagues
100
 in testing Cox proportional-hazard models
101
 
and in stratifying by an indicator for wars that begin with coups d’état. The models use the Efron 
method for resolving ties and have standard errors clustered on the conflict (i.e. to capture the 
link in standard errors between episodes of the same conflict recurring through time). I display 
results in terms of Cox coefficients, that is, in terms of the change in the hazard rate associated 
with a unit change in the covariate. Negative coefficient estimates thus indicate a lower risk that 
a conflict ended in any given time period, and hence, longer conflicts. 
I control for predictors of civil conflict duration that may be plausibly related to ethnic 
exclusion policies. These include democracy (hence I control for a Polity score of 6 or higher); 
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Table 2. Cox proportional hazard estimates 












            
Excluded share -0.954** 
    
 
[0.424] 
    Number of excluded ethnic groups 0.049* 
    
 
[0.027] 
    Size of largest excluded group 
 
-1.220** -0.890 -0.712 -0.659 
  
[0.582] [0.551] [0.637] [0.602] 
Excluded share = 0 (dummy) 
   
0.482* 0.473* 
    
[0.253] [0.252] 
Rebels linked to excluded ethnic group 
    
-0.173 
     
[0.238] 
Rebels linked to excluded ethnic group × 
 size of largest excluded group     
-0.032 
    
[0.682] 





















      Observations 927 927 927 927 2,175 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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rebel territorial control, since rebels may find safe haven among excluded groups;
102
 and whether 
the conflict is over territory rather than over a change in government.  
Results appear in Table 2. The first four models are restricted to rebellions that do not 
make ethnic claims. The core hypothesis receives support in this analysis: civil conflicts do 
appear longer when more of the population is excluded from political power, particularly when 
that population is highly concentrated. In Model 1, I use the share of the excluded population and 
control for the number of excluded groups. The share excluded has a large substantive 
relationship to duration: a 25-percentage-point increase in exclusiveness is associated with a 21% 
lower likelihood of a conflict ending in any given period. Model 2 uses the size of the largest 
excluded group, a more parsimonious indicator. It shows even stronger effects: when the largest 
excluded group is 25 percentage points larger, civil conflicts are 28% less likely to end in any 
given period. These results suggest that even when rebels do not make ethnic claims, the 
regime’s own exclusion practices are linked to longer civil wars. 
However, two qualifications to this general portrait emerge from robustness checks in 
Models 3 and 4. In Model 3, I examine only the bivariate relationship between the size of the 
largest excluded group and civil conflict duration, and find that it is not statistically significant (p 
<.11). The same goes for the share of the population that is excluded (not shown here). Model 3 
therefore suggests that the central result may be sensitive to model specification. However, I 
believe the control variables in Models 1 and 2 are necessary to correctly estimate the 
relationship between exclusion and civil war duration. Notably, democracies are likely to have 
less ethnic exclusion, but they also have much longer civil wars. Models 1 and 2 are preferable 
specifications. 
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It is possible that the key issue is simply whether a country experiences systematic 
exclusion at all, rather than the degree of exclusion. If true, then the loyalty trap would not fully 
explain the link between regime exclusivity and civil conflict duration in non-ethnic rebellions, 
since it emphasizes highly exclusive regimes. To check this, in Model 4, I include a dummy 
equalling 1 if share excluded equals zero and 0 otherwise. When this dummy is included, the 
coefficient on share excluded therefore estimates the relationship between an increase in 
exclusion and civil war duration, conditional on any exclusion occurring. This coefficient 
estimate remains negative, as expected. But it drops in magnitude and is no longer statistically 
significant. In contrast, the dummy for no ethnic exclusion has, as expected, a positive sign 
(meaning shorter civil conflicts) and is statistically significant. This suggests that there may be 
especially long civil conflicts in highly exclusive regimes, but I cannot conclude with confidence 
that they are longer than conflicts in only somewhat exclusive regimes. Some other mechanism 
may be at work to at least explain long civil conflicts in somewhat-exclusive regimes. An ethnic 
frame might be more easily activated even if only a small share of the population is ethnically 
excluded from power. Alternatively, a weak insurgent group without an overall ethnic agenda, 
seeking to fight an irregular war against an established state, may be better able to do so if it can 
make local alliances with excluded groups. It may only require a low threshold of exclusion to 
make such an alliance. In turn, irregular wars that such weak rebels tend to fight are especially 
long.
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 However, the coefficient on the size of the largest excluded group is still substantial, so 
it is still possible that the loyalty trap travels to other highly exclusive regimes beyond Syria, 
lengthening their civil conflicts. 
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On balance, then, it thus appears that ethnic exclusion is associated with longer civil 
conflicts, even where rebels do not make ethnic claims. How substantively large is this effect, 
compared to the impact of rebel group characteristics? And how large are the substantive effects 
of the degree of exclusion, compared to the simple presence of exclusion? To examine this, I 
generate predicted median civil conflict durations at different degrees of regime exclusiveness 
and for rebellions linked to excluded groups and those that are not. First, in Model 5 I include the 
full array of civil conflicts (with rebels claiming to represent and recruiting among excluded and 
included ethnic groups, alongside non-ethnic rebel groups), and an interaction term between 
rebel group claims and the share of the excluded population. I also include the dummy for an 
excluded population of zero. Here, the coefficient on the largest excluded group gives the 
estimate for non-ethnic rebellions, and it essentially reproduces the finding from Model 4.  
Table 3 then gives predicted median civil conflict durations on the basis of this model. In 
each case, categorical control variables are held at their modes. The pattern is striking. Regime 
ethnic exclusion appears to have substantive effects comparable to those of rebel agendas. The 
predicted median civil conflict is considerably longer in an extremely exclusive regime with non-
ethnic rebels than in a moderately exclusive regime (25
th
 percentile) with excluded-group rebels. 
At extremes of exclusion, non-ethnic rebellions experience may quite long civil conflicts. 
Further, though the gap in civil conflict length between no ethnic exclusion and moderate (25
th
 
percentile) ethnic exclusion is large, the gap is larger still in magnitude between moderate and 
extreme (95
th
), although again I caution that the former is a statistically significant difference 
while the latter is not. This suggests that there may indeed be something particular to extremely 
exclusive regimes in the length of the civil conflicts they experience, and the loyalty trap 
provides a good explanation. 
33 
 
Table 3. Predicted median civil war duration, days 
Percentile of regime 
exclusiveness 
(share of largest excluded group) 
Rebels do not make 
ethnic claims 
Rebels linked to 






















 The web appendix includes more information. I include descriptive statistics and describe 
how I recoded some cases from ACD2EPR for the sake of a conservative estimate. I directly 
compare the results here to Wucherpfennig and colleagues’ model to show the added value of 
including regime-side exclusiveness. I confirm empirically that it is important to compare the 
share excluded against the total population, including privileged and politically irrelevant ethnic 
categories. I demonstrate that the result here is not merely due to the presence of simultaneous 
ethnically-mobilized rebellions in ethnically exclusive regimes. I reanalyze my hypothesis using 
a different measure of exclusiveness, and while this analysis disconfirms the article’s hypothesis, 
I provide an argument for why this article’s measures are much more appropriate to my task. 
Finally, I conduct an exploratory analysis of the impact of exclusiveness on the outcome of civil 
conflicts, finding that exclusiveness in particular diminishes the likelihood of rebel victory 
(perhaps because in-group personnel stay loyal to the regime) and may also be associated with 




The Syrian case therefore demonstrates that extreme exclusiveness can undermine the 
credibility of rebel claims to a non-ethnic agenda. The cross-national statistical analysis suggests, 
though not conclusively, that this mechanism may apply more broadly. This analysis has several 
important implications. First, it cautions against optimism about the duration of supposedly 
“non-ethnic” conflicts—i.e. those where rebels do not claim to be acting on behalf of an ethnic 
group. The depressing conclusion is that exclusive regimes can drive long civil conflicts, 
whatever the rebels’ efforts to bypass these politics through a non-ethnic agenda. To the extent 
that the loyalty trap mechanism is in play, rebels cannot necessarily overcome their credible 
commitment problems just by making non-ethnic claims. The problem in such settings is on the 
side of the regime, whose members are essentially locked in to compliance. Rebellions against 
ethnically exclusive regimes might be well justified in principle. But even pluralist rebellions 
against such regimes generate long and bloody civil wars. Rebel groups may not make ethnic 
claims, but regime ethnic exclusivity makes claims on them. 
More broadly, the argument here decouples ethnic conflict from ethnic grievance. It 
suggests that the category of “ethnic conflict” is only partially captured by the official claims of a 
rebel group. Rather, it appears as though regime members’ response to rebel challenges can be 
affected by the degree of ethnic exclusion that prevails, even if ethnic grievances do not appear to 
be what the rebellion is “about,” because they respond to social constructions of ethnic politics 
facilitated above all by the exclusiveness of the regime. Since the statistical analysis suggested 
that other mechanisms may be at work, particularly in less-exclusive regimes, further research 
should propose and assess these different mechanisms. For example, a minimal degree of ethnic 
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exclusion may mean that identity operates as an important frame in at least a part of the 
population that is drawn in to civil conflict as a local ally. 
 Finally, the article suggests that civil wars should be longer when ordinary people are 
more willing to keep fighting and supporting one side. Scholars can therefore build on recent 
research on desertion and surrender
104
 to build hypotheses about civil war duration. It should be 
particularly relevant to focus on what keeps fighters from trusting that the other side will treat 
them well if they stand down. Research can thus usefully examine the impact on civil conflict 
duration of, for example, transparent legal norms that can govern amnesty, strong norms of 
discipline preventing violence against POWs and civilians, and massacres that occur after taking 
territory. 
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